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For banks, fair value adjustments do infl uence dividend 
policy
P. de Jager
3A B S T R A C T
5Most researchers who investigate the interplay between fair value 
accounting (FVA) and the fi nancial crisis look at the time period during 
the crisis. This paper investigates a potential role for FVA prior to the 
crisis: If FVA led to increased accounting profi ts with the recognition 
of transitory gains through profi t and loss during the boom, and if 
those increased profi ts provided the rationale for increased dividends, 
then bank capital became riskier prior to the crisis, and this would 
have made the system more prone to failure. A study by Goncharov 
and Van Triest (2011) found no empirical support for an increase in 
dividends in response to unrealised positive fair value adjustments to 
income. In contrast, when the setting is limited to only South African 
banks, this paper fi nds that South African banks did pay dividends from 
unrealised transitory gains. This fi nding is based on a combination of 
three strands of evidence: a panel regression of the annual dividends 
declared by the large South African universal banks that showed that 
those banks probably ignored the unrealised nature of FVA profi ts when 
dividends were determined; monthly data from the total South African 
bank system in a co-integrated regression that showed that unrealised 
fair value profi ts from the banking book raised the average level of bank 
profi ts materially; and simple descriptive statistics on distributions that 
showed that South African banks distributed a greater proportion of 
profi ts during the critical period of 2004 to 2008 when unrealised fair 
value profi ts from the banking book raised the level of bank profi ts. 
The fi nding that South African banks did pay dividends from unrealised 
transitory gains was also confi rmed by bank representatives and the 
post-fi nancial crisis disclosure of one of the South African banks.
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1The ongoing financial crisis is the worst global economic downturn since the Great 
Depression. Understanding its causes and preventing a reoccurrence is of immense 
social and economic importance.
2Excessive write-down of asset values under FVA, which depletes bank capital, 
has been suggested as a possible cause of the crisis (Veron, 2008; Pozen, 2009:85). 
The question about the role of FVA in the crisis was taken so seriously by American 
politicians, that two official investigations following the crisis have already reported 
on it. The office of the Chief Accountant in the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission found that FVA did not appear to have played a significant role in the 
2008 bank failures (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008). 
The National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis 
(NCCFEC) in the United States’ statutory instructions included an inquiry into 
“accounting practices, including mark-to-market and fair value rules, and treatment 
of off-balance sheet vehicles”. Their final report does not include accounting as a 
major role player in the crisis, but the dissenting Wallison report does (NCCFEC, 
2011). Academic accounting researchers have also started to investigate the role of 
FVA during the crisis, and have mostly found that FVA had an insignificant effect 
(Badertscher, Burks & Easton, 2012; Barth & Landsman, 2010; Laux & Leuz, 2009; 
Shaffer, 2010).
3The above-mentioned studies looked at FVA’s role during the crisis and not 
before the crisis, except for Laux and Leuz (2009:9) who argues “that FVA and asset 
write-ups allow banks to increase their leverage in booms, which in turn makes the 
financial system more vulnerable and financial crises more severe”. In his review of 
the evidence of the role of financial reporting in the global financial crisis, Pinnuck 
(2012) argues numerous times that more attention should be paid to the years 
preceding the crisis. In the popular press it seems to be common knowledge that 
FVA allowed the payment of remuneration and dividends from imaginary2 profits 
during the boom (Haldane, 2011; Kay, 2009; Kay, 2012; Mundy, 2012; Taylor, 2009; 
Wood, 2010). The concern that dividends were paid from transitory FVA gains is 
investigated in this paper.
4Using a Russian setting to investigate this question, Goncharov and Van Triest 
(2011) found that unrealised positive fair value adjustments were not paid out as 
dividends by companies. Their finding accords with the Lintner model (Lintner, 
1956), where only permanent increases in earnings are dividend relevant. Their 
sample contained most Russian public companies and was not restricted to banks 
only. By investigating whether unrealised positive fair value adjustments are paid out 
as dividends in a different setting, namely large South African banks, the aim of this 
paper is to provide a counterexample to the Russian example. This setting is both 
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different from but similar to theirs. By focusing solely on banks, those companies 
most impacted by FVA are investigated with the concurrent disadvantage of a limited 
number of observations. South African banks are rated third best in the world for 
“soundness of banks” by the World Economic Forum (2013:347). The South African 
country setting is similar to that of Russia because it is another BRICS country and 
a commodity producer.
5A behavioural perspective can explain why banks might be more inclined to pay 
dividends from transitory FVA gains in profits than companies in general. Bank 
regulators regard a bank with more capital as a safer bank, whilst bank management 
wants to reduce bank capital to the minimum allowed in order to maximise returns 
for shareholders and thus remuneration for themselves. During the business cycle 
upswing that preceded the financial crisis, banks were making record profits, possibly 
boosted by transitory FVA gains; those profits increased capital. Management needed 
to do something with that additional capital as it reduced the gearing effect available 
and thus future profitability. The increase in capital could have been used to fund 
further loan book expansion as argued by Pinnuck (2012:5), perhaps beyond what the 
market required, and thus turning banks into aggressive sellers of debt; alternatively, 
or probably concurrently, the increase in capital could have been partly reduced by 
paying higher levels of remuneration and dividends.
6The aim of this study is thus not to investigate dividend policy per se, but to repeat 
as far as possible the investigation of Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) in a different 
setting with the implication that the literature review will not be so focused on 
dividend policy as it is will be on their paper and FVA.
7The South African banks context does not allow for a direct test of the dividend 
relevance of positive FVA gains, unlike the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) paper, 
and the investigation thus relies on the following three different strands of evidence: 
First, a panel regression of the annual dividends of the five large South African 
universal banks, which make up 90% of the South African banking system, is used in 
a manner similar to that of Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) to show that the banks 
probably ignored unrealised transitory FVA gains when dividends were determined. 
The same assumption was made as in the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011:54) study 
that these fair value adjustments are transitory. Second, a co-integrated regression of 
monthly total bank profits is used to show that unrealised fair value entries from the 
banking book raised bank profits materially, especially in the critical period before 
the financial crisis (2004 to 2008). Third, simple descriptive statistics on distributions 
is used to show that the banks did not reduce the proportion of profits paid out as 




8Interview and financial statement evidence provide a final confirmation of the 
findings. In contrast to the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) finding, in South 
African banks, positive FVA gains are not ignored when dividends are determined.
9The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant literature focusing 
on the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) paper. Section 3 describes the data and 
the methods that will be used to address the research question. Section 4 presents, 
discusses and interprets the results, and section 5 draws conclusions.
Theoretical background
Earnings persistence and dividends
1Lintner (1956) proposed a partial adjustment model linking reported earnings 
with dividends. Companies aim to pay out a certain percentage of permanent or 
core earnings as dividends. The implication is that dividends can be modelled as a 
function of past dividends and current earnings. Fama and Babiak (1968) confirmed 
the model empirically. Similar links between earnings and dividends have been 
found by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992) in the United States and by 
Goergen, Renneboog and Correia da Silva (2005) in Germany. Skinner (2008) 
found that dividends and share buybacks are complementary in their relationship 
to earnings.
2The Lintner model proposes that managers are reluctant to increase the level of 
dividend payments unless earnings have increased in a sustainable manner. If fair 
value gains and losses are transitory, then the Lintner model would suggest that the 
fair value gains and losses have no distributional consequences.
Fair value accounting
1FVA entered into accounting regulations in the 1990s first in the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 115 (FASB, 1993) in the United States 
and later in International Accounting Standard (IAS) 32, which mandated that some 
securities be accounted for at their fair value. This was followed by SFAS No. 157 
(FASB, 2006) and IAS 39 (IASB, 2005), which both formally defined fair value and 
the measurement and disclosure of financial instruments. South African accounting 
standards closely followed the IASB developments and from 1 January 2005, IFRS 
formally replaced South African Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP).
2Fair value can be broadly defined as “the price that would be received to sell 
an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market 
 For banks, fair value adjustments do infl uence dividend policy
161 
participants at the measurement date” (IASB, 2014:Appendix A). Assets and liabilities 
are categorised into three categories according to the level of subjectivity associated 
with the inputs to measure their fair values. The definitions that follow are based on 
the annual financial statements of Investec Bank Limited (Investec Bank Limited, 
2012:148). Level 1 or mark-to-market represents unadjusted prices in active markets 
for identical assets or liabilities. Level 2 represents an in-between category where a 
direct market price is not used and instead, inputs, observable on markets, are used 
to determine a price suitable for that particular asset or liability. Level 3 or mark-to-
model represents the situation where unobservable inputs are used to derive a fair 
value. This process usually entails the use of some form of discounted cash-flow 
model.
3Not all value changes in financial instruments held at fair value impact profit and 
loss. Only value changes in financial instruments that form part of the trading book 
(including derivatives) as well as value changes in financial instruments designated 
at fair value impact profit and loss. Fair value changes in available-for-sale financial 
instruments are posted directly to reserves. This investigation, like Goncharov and 
Van Triest’s (2011) study, focuses exclusively on the changes that are posted through 
profit and loss. An implication of FVA changes posted through profit and loss is 
that once those entries form part of retained income, it is impossible to separately 
identify which part of retained income is realised and which part is unrealised, even 
though the unrealised part might be riskier. Bank management, who operates in a 
regulatory regime which does not require the specific tracking of those items (e.g. 
Russia and Japan require companies to disclose items through profit and loss that 
are unrealised; this is not required in most Western countries such as South Africa), 
might treat those reserves as being similar to realised reserves and pay them out as 
dividends.
4Prior studies indicate five ways in which FVA can introduce transitory components 
into earnings. FVA brings the present value of future cash flows into current earnings 
(Dechow, Myers & Shakespeare, 2010), even though those cash flows might be subject 
to operational risk. The best example of this practice, often referred to as frontloading 
of profits, is Enron’s recognition of future contract income the moment the contract 
was signed (Benston, 2006). In the case of securitisation, where the accounting 
treatment of the transaction is that of secured borrowing, FVA will frontload the 
interest margin that would have been earned over time (Dechow et al., 2010). In 
addition, FVA might merely pick up a transitory change in the underlying economics 
of an asset/liability and thus bring transitory effects into profit. Also, not all assets 
or liabilities are measured at fair value and this failure to match all the fair value 
changes in the mixed measurement model of accounting can lead to volatility in 
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earnings (Penman, 2007; Plantin, Sapra & Shin, 2008). Furthermore, bubble prices 
can be incorporated into accounting via mark-to-market accounting (Penman, 2003). 
Finally, evidence is emerging that FVA can be used as an earnings management tool, 
especially when combined with securitisation (Dechow et al., 2010).
5Goncharov and Van Triest (2011:54) assume that fair value adjustments are 
transitory, based on previous studies that “suggest managers exhibit over-optimism 
and tend to overestimate implications of current earnings for future earnings”. This 
study makes the same assumption based on the reasons given above as well as the 
acknowledgement by the CEO of one of the five large banks in South Africa that 
FVA gains in earnings are “of lower quality and more difficult to forecast” (Tarrant, 
2013).
Goncharov and Van Triest (2011)
1Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) examined the impact of positive fair value 
adjustments on dividend policy and found no empirical support for the concern 
that dividends increase in response to positive fair value adjustments. Their sample 
period spanned 2003 to 2006, and their final sample consisted of 4 424 firm-year 
observations from 1 179 unique companies listed in Russia. Their core model shows 
that a change in dividends is a function of profitability before the gain through 
profit and loss from FVA and that the FVA gain actually reduced the dividend paid. 
All variables were scaled by average total assets. They made use of controls for size, 
financial leverage, cash holdings and growth.
2Important and unique to their study was the fact that “Russian accounting 
standards mandate mark-to-market accounting for financial investments with 
changes in fair value reported in net income” (Goncharov & Van Triest, 2011:54). In 
their regression model they could thus directly test for the relationship between fair 
value gains in net income and changes in dividends.
3A few areas can be identified for improvement in a replicate study. There is no 
indication in their paper that they controlled for heterogeneity between companies 
in their regression models. The low R2 values indicated collaborate this. The 
use of fixed effects would have had the advantage of better model fit as well as 
compensating for time invariant omitted variables per firm. It can be argued that the 
use of a change in dividend model compensates for firm-specific omitted variables 
that are constant between following years, but this technique does not control for 
all firm-specific omitted variables. The validity of firm fixed effects in the changes 
in dividend models in this paper demonstrates this argument. It has already been 
mentioned that their sample covered most listed Russian companies and was thus not 
exclusively focused on banks – banks are the companies most impacted by FVA and 
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thus arguably of greater interest in the context of the research question. And finally, 
they used the average total assets of each firm to deflate variables used for size, while 
the usual deflator is rather to use market capitalisation (Easton & Sommers, 2001). In 
a later paper by Goncharov (Goncharov & Veenman, 2014:25), an argument is made 
that confirms this point on how to improve the original study: “… we show that 
market value deflation is essential in market-based tests of dividend displacement 
and signalling because it controls for ‘stale’ information in addition to scale (size) 
differences across firms”.
4A few papers have taken the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) study further. In 
a review paper on the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, Brüggemann, 
Hitz and Sellhorn (2013) argue that IFRS adoption, which increases reliance on 
FVA, may cause changes in dividend policies. Kochiyama (2011) utilised a unique 
Japanese setting to investigate whether Japanese companies pay out dividends from 
revaluation profits on the fair valuation of trading securities. From 2001, with the 
adoption of IFRS, FVA revaluation profits and losses from trading securities were 
included as part of net profit in Japan. For the period 2001 to 2006, the Japanese 
Commerce Law implemented the deduction of revaluation profits from distributable 
profits, and the study found revaluation reserves for this period not relevant for 
dividends. However, from 2006 onwards, the Japanese Company Act allowed the 
revaluation profits as part of distributable reserves and the study found that from 
2006 the revaluation reserves were dividend relevant.
5This study will repeat as far as possible the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) study 
in a different setting. The Japanese example above already shows that the Goncharov 
and Van Triest (2011) results did not hold in a different setting when the law allowed 
payments from unrealised FVA gains. For South African banks, there is nothing that 
prohibits them from making distributions from unrealised FVA gains that ended up 
in profit and loss.
Why bank managers might pay dividends from transitory FVA gains
Declining return on assets (ROA)
1Bank managers operate in an environment where earnings are under pressure 
because of the entrance of non-banks into the banks’ competitive space. At the same 
time, shareholder activism is increasing, and one way in which bank managers 
can maintain or achieve the expected return on equity (ROE), even when ROA is 
decreasing, is to increase leverage. Transitory gains from FVA will increase bank 
capital and reduce leverage, all else being equal. Paying those gains out as dividends 




1Another reason for the behaviour of bank managers can be found in agency theory, 
but not in the normal management versus shareholders sense. The capital provided 
by shareholders in the average bank forms only a minor part of the total capital 
utilised in that bank; for example, the average for the five banks included in this 
study over 17 years was 6.23% of the total. Shareholders have little skin in the game 
and they face an asymmetric payoff. If the bank performs really well, then the 
shareholders have an unlimited potential share of the profits, and if the bank fails, 
then the shareholders can walk away from their small investment in the capital of the 
bank. More so than at more conservatively financed companies, bank shareholders 
are incentivised to work together with management to implement strategies that 
will be detrimental to the creditors of the bank. Strategies that reduce the value of a 
bank’s debt without reducing the bank’s total value increase the bank’s share price.
2The most obvious strategy is for the bank to take on excessive risk. If the risk 
pays off, then the reward goes to shareholders and management; if the risk does not 
pay off, then the depositors are left with the result (e.g. see Galai & Masulis, 1976; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hillier, Grinblatt and Titman (2008) summarise another 
three categories of conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders. Firstly, 
companies might pass up profitable investments because the firm’s debtholders 
capture most of the benefits of the projects. Secondly, shareholders are incentivised 
to accept short-term as opposed to long-term projects, even if the latter might be 
more profitable. Thirdly, shareholders may want to keep a firm operating when the 
liquidation value of the firm exceeds its operating value.
3It can be argued that in reasonably efficient capital markets, debt providers will 
be aware of these self-interested incentives of shareholders and price their loans 
appropriately. This raises another agency conflict; management/shareholders/
depositors versus the government. If government insures the deposits of a bank 
directly or indirectly by treating a bank as too-big-to-fail, then depositors have no 
incentive to monitor the banks actively. Depositors would scramble to provide capital 
at any return greater than the risk-free interest rate. Hillier et al. (2008:581) refer to 
the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s as an example. Those managers, shareholders 
and depositors can effectively take on risk with government money and would want 
to pay profits out as soon as possible.
4The theoretical overview has shown that according to ordinary dividend theory, 
transitory fair value gains through profit and loss should have no effect on dividends 
paid. FVA was also introduced and briefly explained and five possible ways discussed 
regarding how FVA can introduce transitory components into earnings. The paper 
by Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) was then discussed, because the current paper 
is strongly related to it. Suggestions were made for improvement in a replicate study 
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in a different setting. Finally, some motivations why bank managers might pay 
dividends from transitory FVA gains were presented. This leads to the following 
research question: Did South African banks pay out dividends from FVA increased 
profits?
5The next section will discuss the data used and the tests that will be performed.
Research approach
1Banks do not normally disclose what portion of their net profit is unrealised. 
The study by Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) was able to directly test whether 
unrealised FVA gains in profit and loss were relevant to dividend decisions owing to 
a unique disclosure requirement in the Russian setting. A direct test is not possible 
in the South African setting because no special disclosure requirement exists in 
South Africa. Hence IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosure (IASB, 2013) does 
not require disclosure of the realised and unrealised portions of items of income, 
expense, gains and losses relating to financial instruments. Only the combined total 
is required.
2Three proxies for FVA gains in profit will be considered in this paper instead of 
a direct measurement. The first proxy will be the difference between net profit after 
tax and broad cash flow from operations (after tax and working capital adjustments). 
The second proxy will be the difference between net profit after tax and narrow cash 
flow from operations (before tax and working capital adjustments). All else being 
equal, an unrealised gain component of net profit after tax should imply a cash flow 
from operations that is less than net profit. A negative aspect of these two proxies is 
that they will contain noise from sources other than only FVA adjustments. The third 
proxy will be the total of extraordinary items in income identified by fundamental 
data provider, McGreggor BFA, including some observations of mark-to-market 
entries. The mark-to-market observations included in the third proxy were few, and 
this proxy also thus seems to be a noisy measure of FVA gains included in profit.
3The first step in the investigation will be to perform a regression analysis, 
explaining changes in dividend, similar to that done by Goncharov and Van Triest 
(2011) – this will be called “dividend analysis” in the rest of the paper. Unfortunately, 
owing to the noisiness of the three proxies for FVA gains, the results will not be as 
trustworthy as those in the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) study. To reinforce the 
argument that FVA led to the recognition of additional gains during the economic 
upswing, a regression analysis will be performed, with the dependent variable being 
the monthly net profit after tax of the total South African banking system (2001 
to 2010)– This will be referred to as “profit analysis” in the rest of the paper. To 
reinforce the argument that banks ignored the transitory components of net income, 
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simple descriptive statistics of the portion of distributable net profit distributed as a 
dividend for all five banks combined, over the period 1994 to 2010, will be shown with 
the period immediately preceding the global financial crisis emphasised. Finally, 
interview and financial statement evidence will be considered.
4Next the data for the dividend analysis will be presented, including statistical 
considerations. Thereafter the data for the profit analysis will be presented, including 
some statistical considerations.
Data and some statistical considerations: Dividend analysis
1Annual financial statement data pertaining to the five largest listed3 South African 
banks were obtained. These data were obtained in a standardised format from the 
fundamental data provider, McGregor BFA, and covered the period 1994 to 2010. 
This period started in 1994 with the democratisation of South Africa and ended in 
2010. These five banks were chosen as they dominate South African banking, all 
have time-series available for the period under discussion and all have securitised 
assets in the immediate past. Survivorship bias is not expected to be a problem 
because this group of banks has been stable throughout the period studied.
2As mentioned in the introduction, this part of the study will attempt to duplicate 
as closely as possible the key model used by Goncharov and Van Triest (2011:60). 
Similarly, the dependent variable in this study will be the change in dividend declared 
by bank i in year t (∆DIVit). DIVit-1 is the first explanatory variable and is the previous 
year’s dividend for that bank. The next two independent variables are net profit 
after tax of bank i in year t before the proxies for FVA adjustments (NPBPROXY?it) 
and net profit after tax of bank i in year t-1 before the proxies for FVA adjustments 
(NPBPROXY?
it-1
). Because the independent variable of interest in the Goncharov 
and Van Triest (2011) study is not available for this study, the following three proxies 
will be considered instead: PROXY1
it
 is the difference between NP
it
 and broad cash 
generated by operations (after tax and working capital changes) by bank i in year t; 
PROXY2
it 
is the difference between NP
it
 and narrow cash generated by operations 
(before tax and working capital changes) by bank i in year t; and PROXY3it is the total 
of extraordinary items identified by fundamental data provider McGreggor BFA, 
including some (incomplete) observations of mark-to-market entries. All of these 
variables have been deflated for size by using average market capitalisation. All of the 
same control variables in Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) will be used, except for 
the cash balance variable, because liquidity is not normally a constraint on a bank, 
and in the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011:60) results, this was the only control 
variable that was not statistically significant. SIZE
it
 is the natural logarithm of total 
assets of bank i in year t. LEVit is financial leverage defined as the ratio of total debt 
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to total assets of bank i in year t. GROWTHit is the growth in total assets of bank i in 
year t. The changes are summarised in Table 1 below.
Table 1:  List of variables used in the main regression of the Goncharov and Van riest (2001:60) 
study compared to the list of the variables that will be used in this study 
cmxcixCategory mGoncharov and Van Triest miThis study
miiDependent
miiiDIVit – change in dividends in year t for 
company i mivDIVit – change in dividends in year t for bank i
mvIndependent mviDIVit-1 is the dividend in year t-1 for company i mviiDIVit-1 is the dividend in year t-1 for bank i 
mviiiNIBREVit – is net income year t for company i 
before fair value adjustments
mixNPBPROXY?it – is net profi t after tax in year t for bank i 
before the proxies for FVA adjustments
mxNIBREVit-1 – is net income year t-1 for company 
i before fair value adjustments
mxiNPBPROXY?it-1 – is net profi t after tax in year t-1 for 
bank i before the proxies for FVA adjustments
mxiiREVit – is positive fair value adjustments due 
to revaluations of short-term and long-term 
fi nancial assets in year t for company i
mxiiiPROXY1it – difference between net profi t after tax and a 
broad measure of cash generated in year t for bank i
mxivPROXY2it – difference between net profi t after tax and a 
narrow measure of cash generated in year t for bank i
mxvPROXY3it – Data provider total of extraordinary items 
including mark-to-market values in year t for bank i
mxviControls
mxviiSIZEit – is the natuaral logarithm of total assets 
in year t for company i
mxviiiSIZEit – is the natuaral logarithm of total assets in year 
t for bank i
mxixLEVit – is fi nancial leverage defi ned as a ratio of 
total debt to total assets in year t for company i
mxxLEVit – is fi nancial leverage defi ned as a ratio of total 
debt to total assets in year t for bank i
mxxiGROWTHit – is percentage change in sales in 
year t for company i
mxxiiGROWTHit – is percentage change in total assets in year 
t for bank i
mxxiiiCASHit – is cash balance defi ned as cash scaled 
by average total assets in year t for company i
1Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for selected income and balance sheet variables 
that will be used in the panel data regression. All of the variables, except for the 









mxxxiDIVit mxxxii0.03322 mxxxiii0.03387 mxxxiv0.01181 mxxxv0.00126 mxxxvi0.05528
mxxxviiNPBFPROXY1it mxxxviii0.18386 mxxxix0.16322 mxl0.19495 mxli-0.39186 mxlii1.21019
mxliiiNPBFPROXY2it mxliv0.11527 mxlv0.09302 mxlvi0.16567 mxlvii-0.24734 mxlviii0.45633
mxlixNPBFPROXY3it ml0.08921 mli0.09169 mlii0.10129 mliii-0.45913 mliv0.28667
mlvPROXY1it mlvi-0.08687 mlvii-0.05351 mlviii0.20336 mlix-1.11592 mlx0.38752
mlxiPROXY2it mlxii-0.01827 mlxiii-0.00788 mlxiv0.16535 mlxv-0.43862 mlxvi0.32822
mlxviiPROXY3it mlxviii0.00778 mlxix0.00088 mlxx0.11155 mlxxi-0.30420 mlxxii0.57559
mlxxiiiSIZEit mlxxiv19.26953 mlxxv19.39181 mlxxvi1.07155 mlxxvii16.18955 mlxxviii21.12349
mlxxixLEVit mlxxx0.94199 mlxxxi0.94462 mlxxxii0.01938 mlxxxiii0.88975 mlxxxiv0.98512





mxcviiiDIVit mxcix0.03323 mc0.03387 mci0.01175 mcii0.00228 mciii0.05486
mcivNPBFPROXY1it mcv0.17963 mcvi0.16322 mcvii0.14958 mcviii-0.22168 mcix0.57842
mcxNPBFPROXY2it mcxi0.11600 mcxii0.09302 mcxiii0.16192 mcxiv-0.17327 mcxv0.45633
mcxviNPBFPROXY3it mcxvii0.09526 mcxviii0.09097 mcxix0.08263 mcxx-0.15126 mcxxi0.28667
mcxxiiPROXY1it mcxxiii-0.08035 mcxxiv-0.05351 mcxxv0.15913 mcxxvi-0.48415 mcxxvii0.23118
mcxxviiiPROXY2it mcxxix-0.01672 mcxxx-0.00788 mcxxxi0.15648 mcxxxii-0.29939 mcxxxiii0.25415
mcxxxivPROXY3it mcxxxv0.00402 mcxxxvi0.00088 mcxxxvii0.08708 mcxxxviii-0.20247 mcxxxix0.24897
mcxlSIZEit mcxli19.26897 mcxlii19.39181 mcxliii1.06655 mcxliv16.26456 mcxlv21.00414
mcxlviLEVit mcxlvii0.94211 mcxlviii0.94462 mcxlix0.01873 mcl0.90467 mcli0.98113
mcliiGROWTHit mcliii0.20626 mcliv0.17125 mclv0.08708 mclvi-0.20247 mclvii0.24897
Note: The data sample represents 17 annual observations from 1994 until 2010 for the fi ve largest South Af-
rican banks. Fundamental data supplier BFA McGreggor was the source of the data. DIVit is dividends in year t 
for bank i. NPBFPROXY1it is net profi t after tax in year t for bank i before PROXY1it. NPBFPROXY2it is net profi t 
after tax in year t for bank i before PROXY2it. NPBFPROXY3it is net profi t after tax in year t for bank i before 
PROXY3it. PROXY1it is the difference between net profi t after tax and a broad measure of cash generated from 
operations in year t for bank i. PROXY2it is the difference between net profi t after tax and a narrow measure 
of cash generated from operations in year t for bank i. PROXY3it is the total of extraordinary items including 
mark-to-market values identifi ed by BFA McGreggor in year t for bank i. All of these preceding variables have 
been defl ated for size by using average market capitalisation. SIZEit is the natuaral logarithm of total assets in 
year t for bank i. LEVit is fi nancial leverage defi ned as the ratio of total debt to total assets in year t for bank i. 
GROWTHit is the percentage change in total assets in year t for bank i. In the bottom half of the table a win-
sorisation4 of 95% has been applied to all the variables.
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1Owing to the fact that the data above are from five different banks and not collated, 
it is to be expected that there will be some individual bank heterogeneity in the 
relationships and that some form of panel regression might be called for.
Panel regression: Dividend analysis
1Panel data regressions first and foremost allow one to formally model the heterogeneity 
across groups that are typically present in panel data (Green, 2008:334; Baltagi, 
2005:4). In addition, panel data regressions provide more robust information, more 
variability, less collinearity among variables and more degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 
2005). A first step in using panel data regression would be to test the errors resulting 
from a normal regression (where the data consists of observations from cross-
sections over time) for heteroscedasticity. If heteroscedasticity is found, one should 
test for the appropriateness or not of fixed or random effects. Not controlling, where 
appropriate, for individual fixed effects or random effects in a data panel can lead 
to an omitted variable bias problem and inconsistent estimates of the regression 
parameters.
2In choosing between fixed effects or random effects, Baltagi (2005:19) advises 
researchers to not simply interpret a rejection of the Hausman (1978) test as an 
adoption of the fixed effects model. That is why it is appropriate to consider what each 
model is for. According to Baltagi (2005:12), the fixed effects model is an appropriate 
specification when focusing on a specific set of companies, and inference is restricted 
to that set of companies, whereas the random effects model is appropriate if one is 
drawing individuals randomly from a large population (Baltagi, 2005:14; De Jager, 
2008). Because the dividend analysis regression is only concerned with the specific 
five banks in the study and not with a larger population, the fixed effects model is 
more appropriate. This line of argument is used in a number of recent accounting 
panel data studies (e.g. Oliveira, Rodrigues & Craig, 2010:246; Setia-Atmaja, Haman 
& Tanewski, 2011:238).
Data and some statistical considerations: Profi t analysis
1The Bank Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
collects certain data on a monthly basis from all banks registered or licensed with 
the Department. In 2010 there were 17 banks, two mutual banks, 13 branches of 
international banks and 41 representative offices registered or licensed with the 
Department (Bank Supervision Department of the SARB, 2011:82). Monthly 
income statement data, collated for all banks, are available on their website. From 
1994 to December 2007 the income statement was known as the DI 200 return, and 
P. de Jager
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from January 2008 it was known as the BA 120 return. This date coincided with the 
introduction of the Basel II Capital Accord in South Africa.
2The content of the DI 200 return and the BA 120 return are not identical, but the 
item “net profit after tax” (NP
t
) appears in both these reports and, after consideration 
of the sequence and the content of the reports, the meaning of this term is deemed to 
be reasonably equivalent in both reports.
3The augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) indicates that the NP
t
 
time-series is not stationary, but possibly trend stationary. A simple time trend and 
exponential time trend were fitted to the data and it was found that an exponential 
time trend fitted NP
t
 better. An even better data fit (as measured by R2 and the 
information criteria indicators) was obtained by replacing the time trend with 
nominal gross domestic product (GDP
t
), also a non-stationary time-series obtained 
from the SARB. Econometric literature (Brooks, 2008) indicates that non-stationary 
data should not be used in a regression, unless a linear combination of the variables 
is stationary. The implication of co-integration is that the two variables are bound 
by some relationship in the long run (Brooks, 2008:336). The Engle-Granger and 






















Note:  The data sample represents monthly observations from January 1994 to December 2010. NPt is net 
profi t after tax combined for all banks in the South African system. GDPt is nominal gross domestic 
product for South Africa.
Figure 1: Stationary residuals obtained by regressing NPt on GDPt
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. The residual series 
shown in Figure 1 above reveals that for the period immediately before the financial 
crisis, NP
t
 was, on average, above the level predicted by its relationship with GDP
t
 
(first large oval in Figure 1).5 For the period following the start of the financial 
crisis, NP
t
 was, on average, slightly lower than the level predicted by its relationship 
with GDP
t
 (second large oval in Figure 1). The points indicated by small ovals are 
all December data points. The ovals in Figure 1 represent where dummy variables 
will be utilised in the final regressions. The up spike in 2001 is because of mark-to-
market adjustments from the banking book entering profit in January 2001. This is 
possibly due to the adoption of the local equivalent of IAS 39 on that date. Harder to 
explain is the down spike in June 2001 which was of a similar absolute size to the up 
spike; this was due to negative mark-to-market adjustments from the banking book 
entering profit. The possibility that these extreme movements might have unduly 
influenced the results of the profit analysis was tested in the robustness checks done 
on the profit analysis.




, a time-series for mark-to-market gains or losses, 
included in NP
t
, was obtained from the DI 200 returns before January 2008. From 
1994 to December 2000, the mark-to-market entry was the total for the banking 
book and the trading book combined. From January 2001 to December 2007, it was 
possible to split the mark-to-market entry between a banking book portion and a 
trading book portion. From January 2008, only a FVA gain or loss on the banking 
book was available. At that time, all FVA gains or losses on the trading book were 
combined with realised gains or losses on the trading book as the bank regulator 
assumed these to be closely equivalent (Bakoro, De Jager & Parsons, 2013). The 




) were built. The first 
of these, M2M1
t
, is the combination of the following: (1) 1994 to 2000, the total mark-
to-market entries; (2) 2001 to 2007, the banking book mark-to-market entries; and 
(3) for 2008 onwards, the fair value entries from the banking book. The second of 
these, M2M2
t
, is the combination of the following: (4) 1994 to 2000, the total mark-
to-market entries; (5) 2001 to 2007, the combined banking and trading book mark-
to-market entries; and (6) for 2008 onwards, the fair value entries from the banking 





found to be stationary.
6The regression explaining NP
t
 (table 6) is based on the observations from January 
2001 to December 2010 only, owing to the unavailability of mark-to-market/fair 
value entries from the banking book as explained above, and the frequent changes in 
South African accounting standards during the late 1990s, with the South African 
P. de Jager
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version of IAS 39 being implemented with effect from January 2001. Descriptive 
statistics for the profit analysis follow in Table 3.





mclxvNPt mclxvi1727461 mclxvii1774856 mclxviii1115036 mclxix-2424046 mclxx4610448
mclxxiGDPt mclxxii146400 mclxxiii137522 mclxxiv45007 mclxxv80841 mclxxvi234498
mclxxviiM2M1t mclxxviii103705 mclxxix144582 mclxxx623516 mclxxxi-2094497 mclxxxii3842738





mcxcviNPt mcxcvii1728438 mcxcviii1774856 mcxcix1033362 mcc-707186 mcci3718659
mcciiM2M1t mcciii80612 mcciv144582 mccv436714 mccvi-1229786 mccvii882181
mccviiiM2M2t mccix120295 mccx116278 mccxi937604 mccxii-1817987 mccxiii2735176
Note:  The data sample represents 120 months of observations from January 2001 to December 2010. NPt is 
the monthly net profi t after tax of all the banks in South Africa combined. GDPt is the monthly nominal 
GDP fi gure of South Africa. M2M1t is the monthly mark-to-market/FVA entries through profi t and loss 
from the banking book. M2M2t is M2M1t + the monthly mark-to-market entries through profi t and loss 
from the trading book for the period January 2001 to December 2007. NPt and the M2Mts have been 
winsorised at 95% in the bottom half of the table because of the presence of large outliers.
Single equation co-integrating regression: profi t analysis
1The co-integrating relationship between NP and GDP implies that a long-run 
relationship exists between these two variables. The interaction between the 
financial and the real sectors of the economy is often procyclical (positive feedback 
mechanisms) (Bank for International Settlements, 2008). Because of this, one would 
expect NP to overshoot its long-run relationship with GDP during the economic 
upswing and to undershoot during the downturn because of the natural procyclical 
nature of bank lending (Kusano, 2011:6); FVA is not required to play any part in 
this overshooting or undershooting. This total overshooting or undershooting will 
be quantified by using three period dummies. A dummy variable (DUMMY1) will 
be used for the period January 2001 to June 2004, which helps one understand 
the base case in which the economy is not in a strong upswing. The next dummy 
variable (DUMMY2) will be for the period July 2004 to September 2008 to signify 
a period when the economy was in a strong upswing, with FVA under IFRS fully 
implemented and the South African banks actively securitising assets. The final 
period dummy variable (DUMMY3) will be for the period that started in September 
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2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the world economy entering a state 
of shock.
2In order to examine the effect of mark-to-market/FVA on the overshooting/
undershooting of NP, the coefficients of the period dummies, before M2M is added to 
the regression, can be compared to the coefficients of the period dummies after M2M 
was added to the regression. If the coefficients of the overshooting/undershooting 
dummies are found to change materially, then the effect of M2M was to influence the 
average level of the overshooting/undershooting. A major advantage of this test is that 
it allows for derivative profits/losses in the trading book to hedge movements in other 
parts of the banks as NP is the final profit figure after any losses or profits have been 
cancelled out by counter-derivative movements. M2M can only have explanatory 
power for NP if no cancellation occurred.
3Next, the results for the dividend analysis will be presented and discussed. The 
results for the profit analysis will then be presented and explained.
Results and discussion
Dividend analysis



























,   (1)
1where i and t represent banks and years. ∆DIV
it










are the current year and the previous year net profit after tax before the proxy 
variables. PROXY?
it
 represents one of three possible proxies for the Goncharov 
and Van Triest (2011) FVA gain in profits presented in Table 1. When presenting 
the results for model (1), only the results for the model with the best fitting proxy 
variable (of the three possible proxies) will be presented (based on R-squared). 
CONTROLS
it
 represents the Goncharov and Van Triest (2011) control variables in 
Table 1. This initial model is a pooled model without fixed effects.
2Cross-sectional and period fixed effects were tested for and found to be valid 
for model (2). These test results are available in the appendix. Fixed effects were 
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1According to Table 2, outliers seem not to be a major issue for the dividend analysis. 
Nevertheless model (5) is model (2) with trimmed observations, model (6) is 
model (3) with trimmed observations and model (7) is model (4) with trimmed 
observations. The results are presented in Table 4.
2Consistent with the Lintner framework and the findings of the Goncharov and Van 
Triest (2011:60) study, the results consistently indicate a negative coefficient on lagged 
dividends and positive coefficients on income with statistical significance. Lagged 
income is mostly negative and not significant, unlike what was found in Goncharov 
and Van Triest’s (2011:60) study. In contrast to the findings of Goncharov and Van 
Triest (2011:59), who reported a negative association between fair value adjustments 
and the change in dividends, no significant negative relationships between the proxy 
variables and the change in dividends were evident For models (2) to (7), in four out 
of six times, slightly significant positive coefficients for the dummy variables were 
found. The control variables were mostly insignificant, especially in the models with 
fixed effects. Statistical tests indicated that model (1) suffers from heteroscedasticity 
and that period and cross-sectional fixed effects are more appropriate. Coefficient 
estimates from (1) are thus unreliable.
3The results from models (2) to (7) indicate that the change in dividend of a specific 
large bank can be explained by the following five factors: firstly, the bank declaring 
the dividend, secondly, the immediate preceding dividend, and thirdly, the current 
and previous profitability of the bank. The fourth factor is the specific year in which 
the dividend was declared and this can be interpreted as arising from competitive 
pressure; after all, if the bank peer group was declaring large dividends, then the 
individual banks would tend to conform. The final factor, in some cases, is the proxy 
for transitory FVA adjustments of the bank; FVA adjustments increase the change 
in dividends.
4Model (3) for the untrimmed models and model (6) for the trimmed models had 
the best model fit as measured by R-squared. As representatives of models (2) to (7),the 
residuals of these two models were tested for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
within each cross-section; neither of these was found to be present. The LM test for 
serial correlation given fixed effects has a value of 0.83 for model (3) and a value of 
0.95 for model (6); the 95% critical value is 1.96. The null hypothesis of no serial
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1correlation cannot be rejected. The LM statistic of the test for heteroscedasticity has 
a value of 19.614 for model (3) and a value of 19.337 for model (6), less than the 5% 
critical value of 106.395 (Chi-square (N-1) distributed) and the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity cannot be rejected. Robust standard errors and covariance clustered 
across the cross-sections are thus not strictly necessary (Thompson, 2011:6).
2Thompson (2011) wrote a paper describing a method for computing standard 
errors that are robust to correlation along two dimensions, as is often found in 
corporate finance data. Thomson (2011:4) reminds readers that double-clustering 
comes at a cost of incorrect statistical inference if the error structure does not support 
the double-clustering choice. He shows that if a panel is unbalanced (in this case it 
is with 16 years and only five companies) it is more important to cluster along the 
dimension with fewer observations, and double-clustering is unnecessary. However, 
in this instance, the errors showed no serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
within each cross-section and clustering across cross-sections is also unnecessary. 
To maintain comparability and to make the conclusions more conservative, we thus 
used White diagonal standard errors and covariance across all the panel data models 
because it is robust to observation-specific heteroscedasticity in the disturbances. The 
residuals of models (3) and (6) are available in the appendix.
3It is of course possible that behaviour might have changed over the course of the 
16 years in the panel. The following robustness check was performed: Significant 
changes occurred during the period 1994 to 2010 in accounting and banking 
regulations and the dividend analysis results were thus tested for stability by splitting 
the sample in two and testing for the period 2001 to 2010 for models (3) and (6) (the 
best fitting models). In the case of model (3), fit improved from adjusted R-squared 
of 0.5236 to 0.5412. The significant regressors remained the same as well as the 
signs on their coefficients, except for the growth control variable that was no longer 
significant. What did not change was that the proxy variable remained insignificant 
with a positive coefficient. In the case of model (6), the fit improved from adjusted 
R-squared of 0.5595 to 0.5986. The significant regressors remained the same as well 
as the signs on their coefficients, except for the proxy variable, which was no longer 
significant. It seems as if the mixed result across the panel for the proxy variables is 
not valid for the period 2001 to 2010.
4The findings in this paper up to this point only served to illustrate a contrast with 
the results of Goncharov and Van Triest’s (2011) study; the FVA adjustment items 
in this paper do not have statistically significant negative coefficients. This evidence 
does not imply that the South African banks were paying dividends from FVA profits 
as the profit measures used in models (1) to (7) excluded the proxies for FVA gains 
and the proxies for the FVA gains were not statistically significant – hence there 
was nothing in the results of the regression models to indicate that FVA gains were 
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increasing dividend payments. If the South African banks were using total profit, 
including FVA gains, when they determined their annual dividends, then the models 
above could be improved by replacing profit before FVA gains with profit after FVA 









 in all the models, the results shown in Table 5 are obtained, where ∆DIV
it
 
could be influenced by profit after tax inclusive of FVA gains.
5Model fit has improved in all the models and the most for the untrimmed models 
compared to Table 4. The average improvement in adjusted R-squared for these three 
models was 11.03%. The untrimmed models now fit the data better than the trimmed 
models. When comparing the coefficients of the untrimmed models above with the 
coefficients of the untrimmed models in Table 4 the following is evident: In all three 
models, the coefficient on the current year profit variable has increased and has 
become more statistically significant. Readers are reminded that the profit variables 
are now larger than they were in Table 4, but the coefficients have increased. All else 
being equal, if profit excluding FVA gains was used to justify dividend changes, then 
the coefficients should have decreased. The coefficients of the lagged profit variables 
are now all positive and significant as in Goncharov and Van Triest’s (2011:60) study. 
The coefficients of all three proxy variables are now rounded equal to zero and 
statistically insignificant. The change in dividends is better explained by total profit 
levels rather than profit levels before the proxy variables, one of which was the total of 
extraordinary gains included in profit. Hence South African banks are using profit 
levels inclusive of FVA gains to justify increased dividend payouts.
6The dividend results were presented to representatives of the banks involved in 
the study, their auditors and bank supervisors at a meeting of the Banking Project 
Group at the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants in Johannesburg 
on 21 July 2010. In reaction to the conclusion that banks ignore the unrealised and 
possibly transitory nature of some of their profits when they determine their dividend 
payouts, the bank representatives responded by agreeing with that conclusion, but 
with the proviso that they believe the effect to be immaterial. The question whether 
FVA impacts bank profits materially is the topic of the profit analysis that follows.
Profi t analysis
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1where t represents months and REPORTING
t
 represents a dummy variable 



























,    (9)
Table 6: Reports of the regression results for the total bank profi ts (NPt) models (8) to (11)
mcdlxNot winsorised observations mcdlxi95% winsorised observations
mcdlxiiRegressor
mcdlxiiiModel (8) – 
excluding M2M1t
mcdlxivModel (9) – 
including M2M1t
mcdlxvModel (10) – 
excluding M2M1t
mcdlxviModel (11) – 
including M2M1t
mcdlxviiGDPt mcdlxviii21.6578*** (6.07) mcdlxix19.9274*** (6.14) mcdlxx20.6331*** (6.76) mcdlxxi18.9418*** (6.12)
mcdlxxiiDUMMY1t mcdlxxiii-1391651*** (-3.78) mcdlxxiv-1270649*** (-3.53) mcdlxxv-1244439*** (-3.59) mcdlxxvi-1104219*** (-3.22)
mcdlxxviiDUMMY2t mcdlxxviii-1222375** (-2.21) mcdlxxix-1005551** (-2.09) mcdlxxx-1075174**(-2.30) mcdlxxxi-871963* (-1.88)
mcdlxxxiiDUMMY3t mcdlxxxiii-2184408*** (-2.89) mcdlxxxiv-1838761*** (-2.71) mcdlxxxv-1988642*** (-3.08) mcdlxxxvi-1650989** (-2.55)
mcdlxxxviiREPORTINGt mcdlxxxviii1645599*** (4.62) mcdlxxxix1514520*** (9.60) mcdxc1431475*** (9.81) mcdxci1311466*** (12.61)
mcdxciiM2M1t mcdxciiiNA mcdxciv0.4413** (2.05) mcdxcvNA mcdxcvi0.4984*** (2.98)
mcdxcviiN mcdxcviii120 mcdxcix120 md120 mdi120
mdiiR-sq mdiii0.628 mdiv0.6867 mdv0.6521 mdvi0.6948
mdviiadj. R-sq mdviii0.6151 mdix0.6729 mdx0.6400 mdxi0.6815
mdxii% increase in DUMMY1t mdxiii9% mdxiv11%
mdxv% increase in DUMMY2t mdxvi18% mdxvii19%
mdxviii% increase in DUMMY3t mdxix16% mdxx17%
mdxxi% decrease in REPORTINGt mdxxii8% mdxxiii8%
Note:  The data sample represents 120 months of observations from January 2001 to December 2010. The 
regressand is NPt–the monthly net profi t after tax of all the banks in South Africa combined. GDPt is 
the monthly nominal GDP fi gure of South Africa. DUMMY1t is a dummy variable for the period January 
2001 to June 2004. DUMMY2t is a dummy variable for the period July 2004 to September 2008. DUM-
MY3t is a dummy variable for the period October 2008 to December 2010. REPORTINGt represents 
a dummy variable indicating fi nancial year-end months. M2M1t is the monthly mark-to-market/FVA 
entries through profi t and loss from the banking book. Model (3) is model (1) with trimmed outliers. 
Model (4) is model (2) with trimmed outliers. Trimmed samples pulled in observations beyond the 
2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The percentage increase on the DUMMYt variables is the increase in the 
coeffi cient on the DUMMYt variables divided by the coeffi cient on the DUMMYt variables before M2M1t 
was added to model (1) or model (3).
*,**,***,  signifi cant at the threshold of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (t-test). T-values are shown in paren-
theses.
2The results for model (8) indicate that the dummy variables introduced in 
equation (8) for the period of overshooting/undershooting and for the upward 
adjustment of financial year-end profits around the financial crisis, were successful 
in capturing some of the variation in the relationship between bank sector net profit 
and nominal GDP. Results relating to the first of the two research questions posed in 
the introduction (about profits) are obtained when M2M1t is added to the equation. 
P. de Jager
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Model fit improves materially and the coefficient on M2M1t is highly significant with 




3The introduction of mark-to-market/fair value entries from the banking book 
helps to explain the level of bank profit earned during the period; note that the 
coefficient is less than one because not all of the before-tax M2M1t series ends up 
in the after-tax NP
t
 series. The introduction of M2M1t also reduces the coefficient 
on GDP
t
 slightly and changes the dummy coefficients by various amounts. The 
percentage changes to the dummy coefficients are presented at the bottom of Table 
6 and can be interpreted as follows: The introduction of mark-to-market/fair value 
entries from the banking book to the model leads to an increase in average profit 
levels across all periods and the increase during the overshooting period just before 
the financial crisis (DUMMY2
t
) is materially more than the increase during the 
preceding period. The impact on the undershooting period (DUMMY3
t
) is to make 
the extent of the undershooting less extreme7 and the impact on the financial year-
end dummy variable (REPORTING
t
) is to lessen the need to increase profits at year-
end by other means. These results are consistent with the view that bankers use 
mark-to-market/fair value entries to increase average profit levels where possible 
and resist decreases in average profit levels where possible (this is similar to the way 
in which Enron managers used mark-to-market – Gwilliam & Jackson, 2008:265) 
Moreover, it is consistent with the view that bankers use mark-to-market/fair value 
entries to facilitate hitting the “right” profit level at year-end.
4Winsorised samples were used in models (10) and (11) because of the presence 
of outliers in the data. The results were slightly stronger (better fit) and proved 
robust. The residuals from equation (11) were analysed for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test returned 
probabilities (0.4145; 0.3921), which implied that the residuals were not serially 
correlated. The White heteroscedasticity test returned probabilities (0.0003; 0.0011; 
0.0000), which implied that the residuals were heteroscedastic. White heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors and covariance were thus used for all models in Table 
6, as suggested in econometrics texts (Brooks, 2008:152; Gujarati, 2003: 418). The 
residuals of model (11) are available in the appendix.





As noted in section 4.3 above, the difference is that M2M2
t
, for the period January 
2001 to December 2007, contained the sum of mark-to-market entries from the 
trading book and mark-to-market entries from the banking book, whereas during 
this period, M2M1
t
 only contained mark-to-market entries from the banking book. 
Model fit declined from model (11)’s adjusted R-squared of 0.6815 to 0.6483 and the 




 was not significant (p-value of 0.1924). An interpretation is 
that the mark-to-market entries from the trading book add little to the volatility of 
total bank profit because these mostly hedge volatility found elsewhere in the bank. 
Mark-to-market/fair value entries from the banking book add volatility to net profit 
and are not hedged away.
6The findings indicate that mark-to-market/FVA entries from the banking book 
influence net profit of the South African banking sector materially. The resultant 
estimate of the transitory component of net profit after tax for the five largest South 
African banks for the years 2004 to 2008 is 0.19/0.98=0.21.
7Figure 2 shows that the large South African banks had been paying out increasing 
portions of profit after tax as dividends over the period 1994 to 2010. All else being 
equal, one might expect that during the boom years (2004 to 2008) a lesser portion of 
profits would have been paid out as some of those profits were shown to be transitory 
in the profit analysis (21%).
General discussion
1The dividend analysis showed that South African banks ignore transitory FVA 
gains when determining dividends, but those gains might be immaterial. The profit 
analysis showed that FVA gains from the banking book, especially for the period 
2004 to 2008, with an estimated increase of 21%, materially raised profit levels. If 
the South African banks had ignored these transitory elements of earnings when 
determining dividends, then, all else being equal, the proportion of profit paid out in 
the period 2004 until 2008 would have decreased. Figure 2 shows an increase.
2An issue in the profit analysis that warrants discussion, the finding that FVA led 
to less extreme undershooting (the impact on DUMMY3
t
) is initially counter intuitive 
in the sense that FVA might be expected to amplify, more or less equally, both the 
upside and the downside of the cycle (procyclicality). These results thus warrant an 
explanation. First, the impact on the undershooting dummy is smaller than that on 
the overshooting dummy. Second, banks have “shock absorbers” available to them in 
the FVA rules to avoid these write-downs; they can argue that market prices are not 
correct and move to mark-to-model values and/or reclassify items held at ”fair value” 
to ”held at cost”. This process was facilitated from October 2008, when accounting 
standards were changed to allow for the reclassification of financial instruments 
from “carried at fair value” to “carried at cost”. Bischof, Brüggemann and Daske 
(2010) and Fiechter and Meyer (2011) found that banks made ample use of these 
opportunities. Third, realised FVA losses that would have materialised when banks 
















Note:  The period emphasised is the period covered by DUMMY2t in the profi t regression that indicated that 
FVA entries from the banking book increased bank profi t levels by 21%; all else being equal, a decreasing 
percentage of profi t available for distribution paid out as a dividend would have been more appropriate.
Figure 2:  The percentage of total bank profi t available for distribution paid out as a dividend 
(combined totals for the sample of 5 banks)
2Final models for both the profit analysis and the dividend analysis fitted the data 
well as indicated by high R2 values and statistical significance. Results also proved 
robust during robustness tests. The reader is reminded of the link between the profit 
analysis and the dividend analysis. Thus, even though the profit analysis used total 
South African banking system data and not individual bank data, the link with bank-
specific dividend policy is that 90% of the South African banking system consists of 
the five banks covered by the dividend analysis. The finding that profit levels are 
increased by FVA during the business cycle upswing is thus directly relevant for the 
five banks in the dividend analysis where it was found that those banks, when setting 
their dividends, did not seem to take into consideration the fact that FVA gains might 
possibly only be transitory.
3Possible caveats include the fact that the banks in the study are all large universal 
banks. It is conceivable that the effects noted were due to the systemically important 
nature of these banks and that smaller banks might be less inclined to distribute 
unrealised profits. In addition, most large South African companies have set up 
black empowerment schemes in which restricted shares were issued to previously 
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disadvantaged individuals. The schemes usually involved payment over time for 
these shares, with payment made from the dividends earned. Thus the decision to 
pay a large dividend can be influenced by the need to ensure that black economic 
empowerment shareholders are adequately funded.
4These caveats do fade slightly when the following changes in the annual financial 
report of one of the banks in the study are considered: The change confirms the 
conclusion that South African banks ignore transitory FVA gains in profit when 
determining dividends. The following paragraph first appeared in the 2010 financial 
statements of the particular bank and should be seen in the context of the drive 
for sustainability following the financial crisis: “The total capital plan includes a 
dividend policy, which is set in order to ensure sustainable dividend cover based 
on sustainable normalised earnings. This also takes into account volatile earnings 
brought on by FVA …” (Firstrand Limited, 2012:134). Whereas Goncharov and Van 
Triest (2011:63) found that “… in all likelihood fair value adjustments lead to lower 
dividend pay-outs”, the results in this paper indicate that in all likelihood, fair value 
adjustments for banks lead to higher dividend payouts.
5The payment of dividends from unrealised FVA profits during the upswing 
would have weakened the actual capital position of the South African banks. Capital 
represented by liquid assets left the system as dividends to be replaced by risky capital 
gains on less liquid assets – effectively reducing the quality of capital.
Conclusion
1Previous researchers have attempted to establish a link between FVA and the 
financial crisis by looking at the crisis period itself, only to find little indication of a 
link. This paper argues that the link is in fact to be found by looking at the period 
preceding the crisis.
2What if transitory FVA gains increased profits during the boom and distributions 
were made from those transitory effects? That would imply a weaker financial system 
entering the crisis.
3A Russian study that investigated this question could test directly for the 
distributionary consequences of unrealised FVA gains because of a unique Russian 
disclosure requirement. This paper could not test directly whether unrealised 
FVA gains are relevant when setting dividends because IFRS 7 does not require 
the disclosure of realised versus unrealised income statement items. Hence the 
conclusions of this study depend on three strands of evidence combined.
4A panel data regression of the change in dividends of the five largest South 
African banks shows that unrealised FVA gains were probably ignored when these 
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banks made dividend decisions. This was also confirmed at a meeting of the Banking 
Project Group and from the financial statements of the banks following the crisis. 
The materiality of transitory FVA gains in profit was shown with a co-integrated 
regression of the monthly net profit of the total South African banking system; FVA 
entries from the banking book increased profits materially. The proportion of profits 
paid out as dividends showed that the banks did not decrease their dividends in 
response.
5This example shows that when unrealised FVA gains are posted through profit 
and loss and end up in retained earnings, managers treat the new capital as risk free.
Endnotes
1. This paper was titled in response to the article by Gonharov and Van Triest (2011), “Do 
fair value adjustments influence dividend policy”. 
2. The terms used include “imaginary profits”, “spurious profits” and “unreliable gains”.
3. The data used in the dividend analysis and the profit analysis relate to different enti-
ties within the same banking group. The profit regressions use data from the registered 
banking entities in each banking group, while the dividend regressions use data from 
the listed entities in each banking group. In all instances, the banking entity in each 
group represents most of the activity within each listed entity. In 2010, the percentage of 
the listed banking group made up of the banking entity in that group ranged from 64% 
to 96% when measured by total shareholders’ equity.
4. Winsorising is the transformation of statistics by limiting extreme values in the statisti-
cal data to reduce the effect of possible spurious outliers.
5. The use of dummies to capture the overshooting and undershooting of profits ignores 
the possibility that GDPt itself was inflated prior to the global financial crisis, as can be 
seen in the following quotation from the Financial Times: “… GDP in 2007 was an il-
lusion, wildly inflated by the debt bubble” (Melville, 2012). A plausible implication is 
that the dummies will underestimate the relationship.
6. Three of the four largest banks, representing more than 80% of the industry, have De-
cember year-ends with the remaining “big four” banks having a December interim 
reporting date. With the advent of the financial crisis and the downturn, it is to be 
expected that banks will try and report as positive a result as possible. For the period 
before the advent of the financial crisis, it can be argued that for remuneration and 
bonus considerations, banks also wanted to report as positive a result as possible. This 
dummy was symmetrically applied around September 2008 for two periods before and 
two periods after.
7. Less extreme undershooting might seem counter-intuitive. Empirical evidence shows 
that banks overvalued their financial assets during the crisis (Laux & Leuz, 2009:32; 
Huizinga & Laeven, 2009). See also the discussion section to follow.
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8. The five largest South African banks represent about 90% of the South African bank 
market by assets and are the main users of FVA among the South African banks.
References
Badertscher, B.A., Burks, J.J. & Easton, P.D. 2012. A convenient scapegoat: fair value 
accounting by commercial banks during the financial crisis. The Accounting Review, 
87(1):59–90.
Bakoro, L., De Jager, P. & Parsons, S. 2013. Commentary: how is accounting information 
used by the South African bank regulator? South African Journal of Accounting Research, 
27(1):181–203.
Baltagi, B.H. 2005. Econometric analysis of panel data. 3rd edition. West Sussex: Wiley.
Bank for International Settlements 2008. Addressing Financial System Procyclicality: A 
Possible Framework. Available at: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/
uploads/r_0904e.pdf?page_moved=1 [accessed 18 May 2015].
Bank Supervision Department of the SARB. 2011. Annual Report 2010. Pretoria: South 
African Reserve Bank.
Barth, M. & Landsman, W. 2010. How did financial reporting contribute to the financial 
crisis? European Accounting Review, 19(3):399–423.
Benston, G.J. (2006). Fair-value accounting: A cautionary tale from Enron. The Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 25(4):465-484.
Bischof, J., Brüggemann, U. & Daske, H. 2010. Relaxation of fair value rules in times of 
crisis: an analysis of economic benefits and costs of the amendment to IAS 39. Working 
paper. Available at: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/files/21389.pdf [accessed 13 December 
2012].
Brooks, C. 2008. Introductory econometrics for finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Brüggemann, U., Hitz, J. & Sellhorn, T. 2013. Intended and unintended consequences 
of mandatory IFRS adoption: a review of extant evidence and suggestions for future 
research. European Accounting Review, 22(1):1-37.
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. & Skinner, D.J. 1992. Dividends and losses. Journal of Finance, 
47(5):1837–1863.
Dechow, P.M., Myers, L.A. & Shakespeare, C. 2010. Fair value accounting and gains from 
asset securitization: a convenient earnings management tool with compensation side-
effects. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(1):2–25.
De Jager, P.G. 2008. Panel data techniques and accounting research. Meditari Accountancy 
Research, 16(2):53–68.
Dickey, D.A. & Fuller, W.A. 1979. Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time 
series with a unit root. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74(366):427–431.
Easton, P.D. & Sommers, G.D. 2001. Scale and the scale effect in market-based accounting 
research. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 30(1–2):25–56.
P. de Jager
186
Fama, E.F. & Babiak, H. 1968. Dividend policy: an empirical analysis. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 63(324):1132–1161.
FASB, vide Financial Accounting Standards Board.
Fiechter, P. & Meyer, C. 2011. Discretion in fair value measurement of banks during the 
2008 financial crisis. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522122 or http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.1522122 [accessed 6 February 2013].
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 1993. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 115: Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities. Norwalk, CT: 
FASB.
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 2006. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 157: Fair Value Measurements. Norwalk, CT: FASB.





1Ns-Gs6XN2kOxvy_bmbg&bvm=bv.45175338,d.ZG4 [accessed 15 April 2013].
Galai, D. & Masulis, R.W. 1976. The option pricing model and the risk factor of stock*1. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 3(1–2):53–81.
Goergen, M., Renneboog, L. & Correia da Silva, L. 2005. When do German firms change 
their dividends? Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1–2):375–399.
Goncharov, I. & Van Triest, S. 2011. Do fair value adjustments influence dividend policy? 
Accounting and Business Research, 41(1):51–68.
Goncharov, I. & Veenman, D. 2014. Stale and scale effects in markets-based accounting 
research: evidence from the valuation of dividends. European Accounting Review, 
23(1):25-55.
Greene, W. 2008. Econometric analysis. 6th edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/
Prentice Hall.
Gujarati, D.N. 2003. Basic econometrics. 4th edition. McGraw-Hill: New York.
Gwilliam, D. & Jackson, R.H.G. 2008. Fair value in financial reporting: problems and 
pitfalls in practice. A case study analysis of the use of fair valuation at Enron. Accounting 
Forum, 32(3):240–259.
Haldane, A.G. 2011. Control rights (and wrongs). 24 October 2011. Wincott Annual 
Memorial Lecture, Westminster, London. Available at: http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2011/speech525.pdf [accessed 12 April 2013].
Hausman, J.A. 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6):1251–1271.
Hillier, D., Grinblatt, M. & Titman, S. 2008. Financial markets and corporate strategy. 
European edition. Berkshire:McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
Huizinga, H. & Laeven, L.A. 2009. Accounting discretion of banks during a financial 
crisis. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7381. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1462010 [accessed 14 August 2013].
IASB, vide International Accounting Standards Board.
 For banks, fair value adjustments do infl uence dividend policy
187 
International Accounting Standards Board. 2005. International Accounting Standard (IAS) 
39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. London: IASB.
International Accounting Standards Board. 2013. International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosure. London: IASB.
International Accounting Standards Board. 2014. International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) 13 Fair Value Measurement. London: IASB.
Investec Bank Limited. 2012. Investec Bank Limited Group and company annual financial 
statements. Available at: https://www.investec.co.za/content/dam/investec/investec-
international/documents/Investor%20Relations/Annual%20Report%202012/IBP%20
annual%20report%20FA%202.pdf [accessed 23 April 2015].
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4):305–360.
Kay, J. 2009. A boom based on little more than a bezzle. Financial Times (London), 5 May. 
Available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/00964de0-39a4-11de-b82d-00144feabdc0.
html [16 May 2009].
Kay, J. 2012. Investors should resist the tyranny of quarterly earnings. The Financial Times 
(London), 29 February.
Kochiyama, T. 2011. Economic consequences of fair value accounting and a change in the 
distribution rule. Working paper. Available at: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstre
am/10086/19122/5/070hibsWP_122.pdf [accessed 8 April 2014].
Kusano, M. 2011. Fair value accounting and procyclicality: accounting for securitization. 
Working paper. Available at: www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~chousa/WP/120.pdf [accessed 
22 February 2012].
Laux, C. & Leuz, C. 2009. The crisis of fair-value accounting: making sense of the recent 
debate. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6–7):826–834.
Lintner, J. 1956. Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained 
earnings, and taxes. The American Economic Review, 46(2):97–113.
Melville, M. 2012. GDP in 2007 was just a wild illusion. Financial Times (London), 31 
October.
Mundy, S. 2012. Albuthnot chief blames accounting rules for loss. Financial Times (London), 
18 March.
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United 
States. 2011. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. U.S. Government Printing Office.
NCCFEC, National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in 
the United States.
Oliveira, L., Rodrigues, L.L. & Craig, C. 2010. Intangible assets and value relevance: evidence 
from the Portuguese stock exchange. The British Accounting Review, 42(4):241–252.
Penman, S.H. 2003. The quality of financial statements: perspectives from the recent stock 
market bubble. Accounting Horizons, 17(supplement):77–96.
Penman, S.H. 2007. Financial reporting quality: Is fair value a plus or a minus? Accounting 
and Business Research, 37(I):33–44.
Pinnuck, M. 2012. A review of the role of financial reporting in the global financial crisis. 
Australian Accounting Review, 60(22):1–14.
P. de Jager
188
Plantin, G., Sapra, H. & Shin, H.S. 2008. Marking to market: panacea or Pandora’s box? 
Journal of Accounting Research, 46(2):435–460.
Pozen, R.C. 2009. Is it fair to blame fair value accounting for the financial crisis? Harvard 
Business Review, 87(11):84–92.
Setia-Atmaja, L., Haman, J. & Tanewski, G. 2011. The role of board independence in 
mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms. The British Accounting Review, 
43(3):230–246.
Shaffer, S. 2010. Fair value accounting: villain or innocent victim. Exploring the links 
between fair value accounting, bank regulatory capital and the recent financial crisis. 
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Quantitative Analysis Unit. Available 
at: http://www.bos.frb.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2010/qau1001.pdf [accessed 12 April 
2013].
Skinner, D.J. 2008. The evolving relation between earnings, dividends, and stock 
repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(3):582–609.
Tarrant, H. 2013. Nedbank’s Mike Brown on First Strut, personal loans and Africa. Available 
at: http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-financial/nedbanks-mike-brown-on-first-
strut-personal-loans- [accessed 20 January 2014].
Taylor, M. 2009. Innumerate bankers were ripe for a reckoning. Financial Times (London), 
15 December. Letter to the editor.
Thompson, S.B. 2011. Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and 
time. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(2011):1–10.
United States Securities and Exchange Commission. 2008. Report and recommendations 
pursuant to Section 133 of the Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act of 2008: study 
on mark-to-market accounting. Available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/
marktomarket123008.pdf [accessed 15 April 2013].
Veron, N. 2008. Fair value accounting is the wrong scapegoat for this crisis. Accounting in 
Europe, 5(2):63–69.
Wood, D. 2010. Unrealised gains out of their hands. Risk.net, 4 February. Available at: 
http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/1589940/unrealised-gains-hands [accessed 
13 August 2013].
World Economic Forum. 2013. The global competitiveness report 2013–2014. Available at: 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf 
[accessed 8 April 2014].
 For banks, fair value adjustments do infl uence dividend policy
189 
Appendix
Additional evidence of statistical work done
mdxxivRedundant fi xed effects tests
mdxxvEquation: Untitled
mdxxviTest cross-section and period fi xed effects
mdxxviiEffects Test mdxxviiiStatistic  mdxxix .f. mdxxxProb. 
mdxxxiCross-section F mdxxxii1.870575 mdxxxiii(4,53) mdxxxiv0.1293
mdxxxvCross-section Chi-square mdxxxvi10.564708 mdxxxvii 4 mdxxxviii0.0319
mdxxxixPeriod F mdxl1.945666 mdxli(15,53) mdxlii0.0388
mdxliiiPeriod Chi-square mdxliv35.094454 mdxlv15 mdxlvi0.0024
mdxlviiCross-section/Period F mdxlviii1.834715 mdxlix(19,53) mdl0.0427
mdliCross-section/Period Chi-square mdlii40.435844 mdliii19 mdliv0.0029























































































































































Note:  Apart from the Investec (2004) outlier, the residuals seem to be reasonably well behaved with no 
obvious patterns visible

























































































































































Note:  Apart from a few outliers, the residuals seem to be reasonably well behaved with no obvious patterns 
visible.
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Note:  Apart from a few outliers, the residuals seem to be reasonably well behaved with no obvious patterns 
visible.
Appendix figure 4: The residuals of model (11) of the profi t analysis
